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Abstract 
Many countries know financial consumer credit ratings, and recent years have also seen a proliferation 
of rating systems in relation to online platforms and in the ‘sharing economy’, such as eBay, Uber and 
Airbnb. In the view of many Western observers, however, the emerging Chinese Social Credit System 
indicates a paradigm shift compared to these former rating systems as it aims for a comprehensive and 
uniform social rating based on penalty and award mechanisms. By contrast, this paper suggests that 
the Social Credit System should be seen a specific instance of a wider phenomenon. Thus, it develops 
a framework that compares different rating systems by reference to their drafters, aims, scoring 
systems, application, use of algorithms, and enforcement; it identifies shortcomings of both low and 
high interventionist rating systems; and it discusses a range of regulatory approaches and emerging 
issues that law makers should consider. 
Keywords 
Social Credit System, Chinese law, reputation rankings, online platforms, law and technology 
  
Author contact details: 
 
Daithí Mac Síthigh  
Professor of Law and Innovation 
Queen’s University Belfast 
United Kingdom 
D.MacSithigh@QUB.ac.uk.  
 
Mathias Siems 
Professor of Private Law and Market Regulation 
European University Institute 
Florence, Italy 
Mathias.Siems@EUI.eu.  
 
  
 
  
Table of contents 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 1 
2. REPUTATION, RANKING, AND RATING ...................................................................................... 2 
2.1 A short history ............................................................................................................................... 2 
2.2 From eBay to Uber and beyond .................................................................................................... 5 
2.3 Regulating rating and reputation systems ...................................................................................... 7 
2.4 Recent trends: algorithms, validation, aggregation ....................................................................... 8 
2.5 Developing a conceptual framework ........................................................................................... 10 
3. CHINA: SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM AND REPUTATION RATINGS ................................................ 12 
3.1 Preliminary considerations .......................................................................................................... 12 
3.2 The Social Credit System and the use of China-wide blacklists ................................................. 12 
3.3 Pilot cities issuing compliance scores ......................................................................................... 14 
3.4 Financial institutions providing social credit scores.................................................................... 15 
3.5 Future perspectives and reception in China ................................................................................. 16 
3.6 The Social Credit System and ‘Western values’ ......................................................................... 17 
4. COMPARISON, EVALUATION AND REGULATION ...................................................................... 19 
4.1 Should we compare? ................................................................................................................... 19 
4.2 A simplified normative framework ............................................................................................. 21 
4.3 The complexities of regulating ratings ........................................................................................ 22 
4.4 The Social Credit System in a global context ............................................................................. 25 
5. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 29 
 
 
 
  1 
1. Introduction* 
It would be easy to assume none of this could happen here in the West. 
But the 21st century is not going to work like that’.
1
 
‘China’s dystopian tech could be contagious’
2
 
 
In 2014 the Chinese government issued a planning outline for the construction of a so-called ‘Social 
Credit System’ by 2020. The implementation of this plan is progressing quickly and it can be 
suggested that the Social Credit System will fundamentally change the life of all Chinese citizens. In a 
nutshell,
3
 its main innovation, once fully implemented, could be that each Chinese citizen will be 
given a score measuring their sincerity, honesty, and integrity, and that this score will then be a major 
determinant for their lives, for instance, whether to be able to get a credit, rent a flat, or buy a plane 
ticket, or being given preferred access to hospitals, universities and government services. 
In this Chinese government programme, the notion of ‘social credit’ serves as an extension of mere 
financial scoring systems from elsewhere in the world,
4
 given that the Chinese ‘social credit’ score 
will consider a wide range of personal factors.
5
 It also resembles, but goes further than, a range of 
systems that are intended to increase the prominence of reputation in relation to transactions, online 
platforms and in the ‘sharing economy’. In addition, the Chinese initiative will cover both companies 
and individuals; the latter is more novel (and more controversial), given the prevalence of ratings for 
the former in the financial sector and in fields such as corporate social responsibility.
6
 Thus, we focus 
here on rating systems concerning individual persons. 
This paper is motivated by the fact that it cannot be assumed that ‘what happens in China, stays in 
China’. The Social Credit system already applies to foreign workers and companies in China, and 
possibly also to all ‘overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese’ regardless of their place of residence.7 In 
addition, it can be observed that China’s economic, political and ideological influence leads to a 
general diffusion of Chinese law; writings about China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the ‘Beijing 
consensus’ of development assistance, and the impact of Chinese investments in Africa, show that 
                                                     
*   The authors wish to thank Jiahong Chen, Zhiyu Li, Jieying Liang, Shaowei Lin, Xiangyang Qian, Shen Wei, Chuanman 
You, Tianshu Zhou as well as Catalina Goanta, Karen Mc Cullagh, John Morison and Ole Pedersen for helpful comments. 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
1   John Harris, ‘The tyranny of algorithms is part of our lives: soon they could rate everything we do’ The Guardian (5 March 
2018) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/05/algorithms-rate-credit-scores-finances-data. 
2   Adam Greenfield, ‘China’s Dystopian Tech Could Be Contagious’ The Atlantic (14 February 2018) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/chinas-dangerous-dream-of-urban-control/553097/. 
3   For details see 3., below. 
4   See 2., below. 
5   The term ‘social credit’ has also two further meanings that are outside the scope of this paper, namely, as an economic 
reform programme developed in the 1920s (see C.H. Douglas, Social Credit, Institute of Economic Democracy, 1924) and 
as a type of ‘micro-credit aiming at fighting poverty’ (see Fernando A. F. Ferreira et al. ‘A Socio-Technical Approach to 
the Evaluation of Social Credit Applications’ (forthcoming) Journal of the Operational Research Society DOI: 
10.1080/01605682.2017.1415650). 
6   Despite many differences, see e.g. Larry Catá Backer, ‘Next Generation Law: Data Driven Governance and Accountability 
Based Regulatory Systems in the West, and Social Credit Regimes in China’, Working Paper (7 July 2018), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209997. 
7   See Samantha Hoffman, ‘Social credit: technology-enhanced authoritarian control with global consequences’, Policy Brief 
Report No.6/2018, available at http://apo.org.au/node/180186. 
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China’s influence abroad is not merely of an economic nature but that it increasingly shapes law and 
policy
 
elsewhere.
8
 
It may of course be argued that the Social Credit System is something that should be seen as not a 
model but as a counter-model for other countries.
9
 We seek to provide a critical but also nuanced and 
measured assessment, against a backdrop of typical ‘Western’ responses which simply dismiss the 
Social Credit System as ‘Orwellian’, and a general lack of any critical debate on the topic in China.10 
In particular, this paper will also address the predominantly Western debates on the importance of 
reputation and grading/ranking and on the power of algorithms, showing that this new Chinese system 
can be seen a specific instance of a wider phenomenon. Even more so, as reputation-based quantitative 
tools have become established in the West, the Social Credit System may tell us something about their 
evolution in Western countries (or even the future of global normative orders
11
). 
Accordingly, this paper is interested in a number of overlapping research questions: to start with, how 
can we understand both the Chinese and Western systems by reference to their drafters, aims, scoring 
systems, application, use of algorithms, and enforcement? Is it then the case that the Social Credit 
System is based on a unique strongly interventionist logic, or could there be mixtures between the 
Chinese and Western models? And if reputation and rating systems consolidate in Western markets in 
a similar fashion, what opportunities, features, controversies, and pitfalls will arise? And how could 
law makers intervene if this happens?  
The corresponding structure of this paper is as follows. Part 2 maps the general debate about 
reputation, ranking and rating in the West (setting out salient features of its history in credit scoring 
and related systems, and identifying the significance of reputation data for online business and the 
‘sharing’ or peer-to-peer economy); we conclude this part by considering certain controversies 
regarding such data, and setting out an initial framework for analysis. Then, Part 3 explains the 
operation of China’s Social Credit System today as well as likely future developments. On this basis, 
Part 4 compares and evaluates both of these systems, identifying shortcomings of low and high 
interventionist rating systems, and assessing a range of regulatory approaches. Part 5 concludes. 
2. Reputation, ranking, and rating 
2.1 A short history  
Although the identification and dissemination of reputational information has formed an important 
aspect of 21
st
-century e-commerce and sharing economy business models, the concept is certainly a 
more established one. The best known is probably found in the financial sector, where the ‘rating’ of 
the creditworthiness of companies, institutions, individuals, and financial instruments (e.g. bonds) has 
a longer history,
12
 and has progressed beyond narrower, single-purpose origins to becoming a ‘key 
component of global financial governance’.13 
                                                     
8   See e.g. Samuli Seppänen, ‘Chinese Legal Development Assistance: Which Rule of Law? Whose Pragmatism?’ (2018) 51 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 101; Wenxian Zhang, Ilan Alon, and Christoph Lattemann (eds.), China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative: Changing the Rules of Globalization (Palgrave 2018). 
9   Or if it were to influence other countries, it may be argued that it should be seen as a ‘malicious legal transplant’, cf. 
Mathias Siems, ‘Malicious Legal Transplants’ (2018) 38 Legal Studies 103. 
10   See further 3.5 and 3.6, below. 
11   Cf. Larry Catá Backer, ‘And an Algorithm to Bind them All? Social Credit, Data Driven Governance, and the Emergence 
of an Operating System for Global Normative Orders’, Working Paper (21 May 2018), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182889. 
12  Donncha Marron, Consumer Credit in the United States (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 100. 
13  Bruce Carruthers, ‘From uncertainty toward risk: the case of credit ratings’ (2013) 11 Socio-Economic Review 525, 530. 
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In Lauer’s history of the development of consumer credit reporting and scoring in the United States 
since the 19
th
 century, he emphasises the development of an information infrastructure in finance, 
including shifts towards a quantitative basis throughout the 20
th
 century, and computerisation and the 
application of statistical methods to risk and creditworthiness from the 1960s onwards.
14
 Other 
significant developments include the emphasis upon individual ‘scores’ in the late 20th century,15 and 
continuous monitoring and surveillance rather than simple blacklisting
16
 (or, as Pasquale puts it 
regarding the 21
st
 century, the move to a ‘scored society’ in place of mere credit scores17). These 
developments sit within the a longer trajectory towards increased access to information which has, 
since the 18
th
 century, driven ‘fact- and theory-based approaches to issues of finance and credit’ (in 
respect of individuals and companies) and attempted to neutralise ‘irrationality’ and 
misunderstanding
18
 and replace uncertainty with an assessment of risk.
19
 The increased involvement of 
mainstream banks in credit scoring, from the 1960s onwards, has also supported an algorithmic-led 
approach to risk and the likelihood of repayment.
20
 
Credit scoring has also developed in the UK and across Europe
21
 – although different legal and 
cultural approaches to data protection have meant that the pace of change has been different. 
Corporate transactions, such as the acquisition of Experian (formerly TRW, a major player from the 
computer age in the US
22
) by Great Universal Stores (a UK-based mail order retailer which had 
developed a successful credit scoring function of its own)
23
, have promoted further convergence. 
These financial matters form part of a broader trend. Classification systems and the urge to classify 
have deep roots in human societies, but were a major feature of scientific and capitalist development 
in the 20
th
 century; they are ubiquitous and built into every aspect of social and commercial life, and 
combine ‘social organization, moral order, and layers of technical integration’.24 The late 20th century 
also saw the rise in popularity of key performance indicators, ‘league tables’, and the like, as part of 
the New Public Management revolution
25
 and a shift towards the ‘production of performance 
                                                     
14  Josh Lauer, Creditworthy: A History of Consumer Surveillance and Financial Identity in America (Columbia University 
Press 2017) 40 and 183. 
15  Ibid 249. 
16  Marron, above n 12, at 105-7; Lauer, above n 14, at 60. 
17  Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information (Harvard University 
Press 2015) 22-25. See also Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers, What’s Mine is Yours: How Collaborative Consumption is 
Changing the Way we Live (Collins 2010) 217 (on how the 20th-century importance of credit ratings relates to ‘consumers 
operating in a hyper-individualistic world’ rather than the position of individuals within a community). 
18  Jeremy Black, The Power of Knowledge: How Information and Technology Made the Modern World (Yale University 
Press 2014) 193. 
19  Carruthers, above n 13, at 529. 
20  Lauer, above n 14, at 191. 
21  Thomas Wainwright, ‘Elite Knowledges: Framing Risk and the Geographies of Credit’ (2011) 43 Environment & Planning 
A 650, 653 (highlighting the later adoption of methods in the UK, influenced by US practices); Akos Rona-Tas and Alya 
Guseva, ‘Consumer Credit in Comparative Perspective’ (2018) 44 Annual Review of Sociology 55, 62-64 (for a general 
survey). 
22  Marron, above n 12, at 104. 
23  Nigel Cope, ‘GUS shares soar on £1bn acquisition’ The Independent (15 November 1996). Ten years later, the (combined) 
credit scoring business was demerged: Simon English, ‘Experian to raise new equity in demerger from GUS’ The 
Independent (29 March 2006).  
24  Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences (MIT Press 1999) 33, 37 
(ubiquity), 3-5 (historical understandings), 324-5 (integration into information systems). 
25  Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford University Press 
2011) 106-111; Christopher Hood and Ruth Dixon, A Government that Worked Better and Cost Less?: Evaluating Three 
Decades of Reform and Change in UK Central Government (Oxford University Press 2015) ch 3; Wendy Nelson Espeland 
Daithí Mac Síthigh and Mathias Siems 
4 Department of Law Working Papers 
information with regulatory or quasi-regulatory purposes’26. Well-known examples include assigning 
core research funding to universities in the United Kingdom (and, increasingly, elsewhere),
27
 and the 
evaluation of federal government programmes in the United States.
28
 The economic impact of prizes 
for contemporary art
29
 and the grading of restaurants
30
 has been observed.  
For individuals in labour markets, we see schemes such as quantitative approaches to determining the 
promotion of civil servants in the European Union.
31
 In the last year alone, new developments in the 
UK include a requirement (imposed by competition and financial regulators) that financial institutions 
provide information on how likely customers would be to recommend its services to others,
32
 and a 
proposed extension of a scheme attempting to measure the quality of university teaching beyond 
institutions to individual subjects, described by the responsible Minister as akin to the financial 
services comparison site MoneySupermarket.
33
 These ‘calculative practices [which] render previously 
incomparable elements visible and comparable’34, while mostly focused upon institutions rather than 
individuals, normalise the collection and communication of data in this fashion, and allow for more 
effective methods of presentation and analysis.  
As well as highlighting the benefits of an ‘objective’ approach,35 contemporary versions of credit 
scoring and new public management also have in common a tendency to collect and analyse data at a 
relatively centralised level; that is, it is the credit scoring agency or the public audit authority that is 
gathering data (albeit from multiple sources) and providing advice (or at least aggregated and 
sometimes ranked data) on the performance, solvency, or quality of the data subjects. In other cases, 
however, the ‘score’ (whether concerning an individual or an institution) will simply reflect the data 
(Contd.)                                                                  
and Michael Sauder, ‘Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds’ (2007) 113 American 
Journal of Sociology 1. 
26  Afshin Mehrpouya and Rita Samiolo, ‘Performance Measurement in Global Governance: Ranking and the Politics of 
Variability’ (2016) 55 Accounting, Organizations and Society 12, 13. 
27  Rob van Gestel, ‘Ranking, Peer Review, Bibliometrics and Alternative Ways to Improve the Quality of Doctrinal Legal 
Scholarship’ in Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz and Edward Rubin, Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic 
Dialogue (Cambridge University Press 2017); Mary Henkel and Maurice Kogan, ‘United Kingdom’ in David Dill and 
Frans van Vught (eds), National Innovation and the Academic Research Enterprise (Johns Hopkins University Press 
2010). 
28  John Gilmour, ‘Implementing OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART): Meeting the Challenges of Integrating 
Budget and Performance’ (2007) 7 OECD Journal on Budgeting 1. 
29  Pierre Pénet and Kangsan Lee, ‘Prize & Price: The Turner Prize as a Valuation Device in the Contemporary Art Market’ 
(2014) 43 Poetics 149. 
30  Lucien Karpik, Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities (Princeton University Press 2010, tr. Nora Scott) 77-
80. 
31  E.g. Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, Regulation 259/68, [1968] OJ L 56/1 (as amended); see further 
Carolyn Ban, ‘Performance Appraisal and Promotion in the European Commission: the Challenge of Linking 
Organizational and Individual Accountability’ (conference paper, Accountability and Governance in International 
Organizations, Konstanz, June 2008) http://www.pitt.edu/~cban/Research/Ban%20EC%20accountability%20paper.doc  
32  Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Banks scored on quality of service’ (15 August 2018) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/banks-scored-on-quality-of-service; Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Making it easier 
to use and compare current accounts’ (15 August 2018) https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stories/making-it-easier-use-
and-compare-current-accounts. 
33  Department for Education, ‘Universities to be rated by subject quality’ (12 March 2018) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/universities-to-be-rated-by-subject-quality; see Eleanor Busby, ‘University degree 
courses to be ranked in 'MoneySuperMarket' style system, minister says’ The Independent (12 March 2018) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/degree-courses-university-students-rankings-teaching-
excellence-framework-sam-gyimah-a8251866.html. 
34  Martin Kornberger and Chris Carter, ‘Manufacturing Competition: How Accounting Practices Shape Strategy Making in 
Cities’ (2010) 23 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 325, 332. 
35  As emphasised by Marron, above n 12, at 104. 
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submitted by users of a given service – whether that be regarding the service provider or, as in the case 
of certain online businesses, other service users.  
2.2 From eBay to Uber and beyond 
The success of eBay and related sites has long been attributed, in part, to the way in which a platform 
has become ‘trusted’ by users and how well-understood information asymmetries are handled and 
countered. Trust in a sales platform is said to be a combination of payment security, reliable and 
affordable schemes for dispute resolution, and – of present interest – ‘trust building measures like the 
mutual rating system which allows for online reputation’.36 eBay’s reputation system, where buyers 
and sellers rate each other (with comments published for all to see), was added very shortly after it 
began business, in order to address allegations of cheating; it became an established feature of the site 
and is still in operation.
37
 Indeed, the different aspects of trust are interlinked as, for instance, a failure 
to engage with the dispute resolution process affects the reputation of a user.
38
 Moreover, a user’s 
ability to trade in the future will be affected by their score and feedback and therefore by their earlier 
actions;
39
 eBay’s system has seen high levels of participation, with traders with positive reputations 
found to be more likely to succeed in selling items on the platform;
40
 it also allows eBay to exclude 
from the marketplace users with very low ratings.
41
 
Present-day observers note that online trust encompasses ‘digital social capital’ and various means of 
certifying and validating market participants.
42
 This however draws upon a longer history of 
identifying the reliability of individuals: Lauer highlights how credit systems which valorised 
character and hard work rather than social standing were an important facilitator of the emergence of 
US consumer capitalism,
43
 while Packin and Lev-Aretz point to the more recent use of big data and 
the analysis of ‘online social footprints’ as a proxy for character, which in the history of credit scoring 
is seen as a reliable predictor of the ability and likelihood of repayment.
44
 Unsurprisingly, the 
overlapping developments in reputation, big data, analytics, and Internet-driven business models, lead 
some to conclude that we now live in a ‘reputation economy’ where reputation is an asset.45 
As the ‘sharing economy’ or ‘collaborative economy’ emerged as the latest Internet phenomenon (and 
business catchphrase) in recent years, the role of reputational systems has also been obvious. The 
sharing economy purports to be based around interpersonal relations and seeking an alternative to 
‘functional, cold and impersonal relations engendered by capitalism’ with authenticity and trust.46 
Consequently, all major economy platforms, such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit, and indeed 
                                                     
36  Gralf-Peter Calliess, ‘Online Dispute Resolution: Consumer Redress in a Global Market Place’ (2006) 7 German Law 
Journal 647, 652. 
37  Clay Shirky, Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age (Allen Lane 2010) 177-8. 
38  Calliess, above n 36, at 653. 
39  Botsman and Rogers, above n 17, at 140. 
40  Paul Resnik and Richard Zeckhauser, ‘Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis of eBay’s 
Reputation System’ in Michael Baye (ed.) The Economics of the Internet and E-commerce (Emerald 2002). 
41  Cliff Lampe, ‘The Role of Reputation Systems in Managing Online Communities’ in Hassan Masum and Mark Tovey 
(eds), The Reputation Society: How Online Opinions Are Shaping The Offline World (MIT Press 2012) 82. 
42  Arun Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-based Capitalism (MIT Press 
2016) 61. 
43  Lauer, above n 14, at 26, 33. 
44  Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, ‘On Social Credit and the Right To Be Un-networked’ [2016] Columbia 
Business Law Review 339, 343. 
45  Michael Fertik and David Thompson, The Reputation Economy (Random House 2015). 
46  Nicholas John, The Age of Sharing (Polity Press 2017) 148. 
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precursors such as CouchSurfing, make use of a combination of scoring and feedback systems.
47
 The 
availability of a community of users familiar with eBay-like feedback schemes and social media 
services, and the technological innovation that facilitated reputation-based services on earlier sites, is a 
factor in the rapid adoption of sharing economy services.
48
 Indeed, the wider economic shift towards 
peer-to-peer provision, and indeed the reshaping of labour markets in the ‘gig’ economy, continues to 
see reputational information emphasised as a key component of the model. 
How is reputational data used in these contexts? An obvious example is ridesharing services, where 
drivers and passengers rate each other. A driver with a comparatively low score (the aggregate of 
passenger scores) can ultimately be removed from the platform or restricted to providing a more 
limited range of services,
49
 while a passenger is more likely to be picked up if they have a high rating 
from past drivers
50
 (passenger ratings were formerly not visible to passengers or required effort to 
view, but a 2017 change meant that a passenger sees their own rating each time they use the app).
51
 
Airbnb feedback often includes detailed accounts of visitor experiences, with hosts having the 
opportunity to add their own comments in reply; a good reputation score for a host means that their 
accommodation may be returned at the top of search results.
52
 A good reputation appears to be 
correlated with an ability to demand higher prices, though there is variation between how the strength 
of reputation is measured (e.g. mean score vs number of positive reviews).
53
 Another example of the 
use of reputational mechanisms is ‘gamification’, where platforms build in tools inspired by the 
mechanisms developed and perfected within the computer game sector for other purposes,
54
 to 
incentivise good behaviour and drive active participation and engagement over a longer period.
55
 Such 
                                                     
47  Botsman and Rogers, above n 17, at 178-9 (reputation on couchsurfing.com), 217 (‘with the Web we leave a reputation 
trail’, i.e. ‘a cumulative record of how well we collaborate and if we can be trusted’). 
48  Sundararajan, above n 42, at 25; Brad Stone, The Upstarts: How Uber, Airbnb and the Killer Companies of the New 
Silicon Valley are Changing the World (Transworld 2017) 10-11 (‘Airbnb and Uber substituted [for older regulatory 
regimes] the self-policing tools pioneered by internet marketplaces like eBay – riders graded their drivers and guests 
evaluated their hosts, and vice versa’); Joel Klein, ‘Baby , you can drive my car’ Time (9 February 2015) 34 (‘the key to 
this shift was the discovery that while we totally distrust strangers, we totally trust people…many sharing-company 
founders have one thing in common: they worked at eBay and, in bits and pieces, recreated that company’s trust and safety 
division…its innovation was getting both the provider and the user to rate each other’). 
49  In the early (2012) service Sidecar, drivers were only eligible to use the platform if their score remained above a required 
minimum: Stone, above n 48, at 197-8. Uber allows drivers with higher ratings to provide higher-priced services (Uber 
Exec and Uber Lux): Uber BV v Aslam (UK Employment Appeals Tribunal, 10 November 2017) [9] and deactivates (after 
notices and opportunities to improve) the accounts of drivers with low ratings - below 4.4 out of 5 (ibid, [29], [56]) – or, 
allegedly, below 4.7 in some situations: Tom Slee, What's yours is mine: against the sharing economy (Scribe 2017) loc 
1286. 
50  Rebecca Rose, ‘The shame of my very low Uber rating’ Financial Times (4 July 2018). On identifying reliable customers 
for new business models through reputation systems, see Lisa Gansky, The Mesh: Why the Future of Business is Sharing 
(Penguin 2010) 105. 
51  Mike Truong and Ronak Trivedi, ‘Updates to the rating system’ (Uber, 26 April 2017) 
http://www.uber.com/en_GB/newsroom/ratingsupdate-2/. 
52  Georgios Zervas, Davide Prosperio and John Byers, ‘A First Look at Online Reputation on Airbnb, Where Every Stay is 
Above Average’, Working Paper (25 January 2015), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2554500.  
53  Will Qiu, Palo Parigi and Bruno Abrahao, ‘More Stars or More Reviews? Differential Effects of Reputation on Trust in the 
Sharing Economy’ [2018] Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 153. 
54  E.g. ‘taking things that aren’t games and trying to make them feel more like games’: Flavio Escribano, ‘Gamification As 
the Post-Modern Phalanstère’ in Peter Zackariasson and Timothy Wilson (eds), The Video Game Industry: Formation, 
Present State, and Future (Routledge 2014) 201; ‘providing us with voluntary obstacles related to our real-world activity 
and by giving us better feedback really can help us make a better effort’: Jane McGonigal, Reality is Broken: Why Games 
Make Us Better and How They Can Change the World (Vintage 2012) 148. 
55  Juho Hamari, Mimmi Sjöklint and Antii Ukkonen, ‘The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative 
Consumption’ (2016) 67 Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 2047 (in general); Slee, 
above n 49, at loc 1274 (Uber drivers); Sarah Mason, ‘High score, low pay: why the gig economy loves gamification’ The 
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tools (which are also being used in other sectors, such as education) include progress between levels, 
the collection of points, and the availability of rewards.
56
  
2.3 Regulating rating and reputation systems 
What is the role of the state, and of various means of legal control or oversight, in the systems 
discussed in the above paragraphs? In a limited number of cases, state authorities have initiated 
schemes that purport to ‘rate’ individuals (albeit on a simpler basis of passing a threshold rather than a 
comprehensive ranking). For instance, some countries use a point-based immigration system.
57
 
Another example across many European states is the introduction of ‘penalty points’ as a method of 
enforcing road traffic law, alongside or in substation for the more conventional means of the court 
system.
58
 These penalty point systems have seen limited development; they are, for instance, normally 
confined to single states. However, the value of such data as an indication of the ‘reputation’ of the 
data subject, for various purposes, has become clear;
59
 in particular, car hire companies can choose not 
to rent cars to drivers who have exceeded a particular limit of penalty points.
60
 
In other cases (and more characteristic of the development of these systems in the countries discussed 
in this part), the nexus between the state and rating and reputation systems is through acquiescence 
and encouragement, rather than the system being managed by a public authority. While consumer 
credit scoring has predominantly been a private sector activity, it has certainly benefitted from 
ostensibly unrelated aspects of public administration, such as the creation of a unique identifier for 
individuals in the US for social security purposes.
61
 Public bodies engaged with the financial system 
can also play a role in standardising the use of private data through the exercise of their functions.
62
 
More generally, the (private) rating of bonds has long played a role in public finances, including 
statutory requirements.
63
 
States also play a key role through forbearance (especially beyond higher profile systems such as 
credit); the nature of many sharing economy business models, where licensing or registration is absent, 
means that heavy emphasis is placed by users on the quality of reputational information provided 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Guardian (20 November 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/nov/20/high-score-low-pay-gamification-lyft-
uber-drivers-ride-hailing-gig-economy (Lyft drivers).    
56  E.g. Amy DuVernet, Alberto Asquer and Inna Krackkovskaya, ‘The Gamification Of Education and Business: A Critical 
Analysis and Future Research Prospects’ in F. Xavier Olleros and Majlinda Zhegu (eds), Research Handbook on Digital 
Transformations (Edward Elgar 2016); on gamification, e-learning, and student performance, see David Willetts, A 
University Education (Oxford University Press 2017) 333. 
57  For the discussion see e.g., Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Madeleine Sumption, ‘Rethinking Points Systems and 
Employer-Selected Immigration’, Report of the Migration Policy Institute, 2011, available at 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/rethinking-points-systems-and-employer-selected-immigration. For the Chinese 
point system for internal migration see n 139, below.  
58  In Great Britain, see Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s 28 and https://www.gov.uk/penalty-points-endorsements. In 
Germany, see Straßenverkehrsgesetz, s 28 and https://www.kba.de/EN/ZentraleRegister_en/FAER_en/faer_node_en.html. 
The associations between the development of driver licensing and credit scoring has long been understood; in his 
landmark analysis of privacy and technology, Rule dedicates a chapter to each: James Rule, Private Lives and Public 
Surveillance (Penguin 1973) ch 3 and 5. 
59  Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin, ‘The Automatic Management of Drivers and Driving Spaces’ (2007) 38 Geoforum 264, 
268. 
60  See e.g. https://www.rentalcars.com/en/guides/licence-paperwork/points-on-licence/. 
61  Lauer, above n 14, at 198-9. 
62  Lauer, above n 14, at 249 (on the use of private credit scores in the Government-based home lending system in the 1990s, 
and how it contributed to the success and adoption of changes in scoring); Wainwright, above n 21, at 655 (on the 
significance of financial regulator pressure on lenders to be assured of ability to repay, and of the relative cost of different 
approaches, on the working methods of lenders). 
63  Carruthers, above n 13, at 538. 
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through the platform.
64
 A related point is the type of liability attached to the very act of ranking, 
reviewing, or rating. US law generally takes the approach that a view on creditworthiness or an review 
(or even scoring) of a service is an opinion protected by the First Amendment as an aspect of freedom 
of speech,
65
 while minimising exposure to defamation claims has long been a concern for the credit 
rating industry and for (non-sharing) online review sites alike.
66
 
Finally, where there is concern about the implications of rating, there will be the possibility of the 
introduction of a regulatory regime or the application of more general provisions. For instance, credit 
scoring is also the subject of specific regulation in the US and the body of data protection law in other 
jurisdictions.
67
 Calls for greater regulation in other areas, on the basis of criticisms of the status quo in 
rating and reputation-based systems, are discussed in part 4, below. 
2.4 Recent trends: algorithms, validation, aggregation  
Even the more conventional forms of reputation-based decision making have undergone further 
change in light of Internet use and the availability of novel sources of data. A subject’s use of social 
media or indeed of sharing economy sites can, for instance, be used as a proxy for creditworthiness. 
An Australian scheme for alternative (and significantly cheaper) deposits on rented properties, 
Trustbond, makes use of both types of data.
68
 A Singapore-based lender, Lenddo, claims to use ‘non-
traditional data…to economically empower the emerging middle class’, which includes various social 
media sources.
69
 A US firm, Tala, operates in developing nations in Africa and Asia, claiming to 
utilise up to 10,000 ‘data points’ such as social media and smartphone use, in order to create a new 
type of credit score to the advantage of lower-income customers.
70
 
                                                     
64  Sofia Ranchordás, ‘Online Reputation and the Regulation of Information Asymmetries in the Platform Economy’ (2018) 5 
Critical Analysis of Law 127, 143. 
65  Jefferson County School District v Moody’s Investor’s Services (1997) 988 F Supp 1341 (‘The bond market depends in 
large measure upon the free, open exchange of information concerning bond issues and the First Amendment is ultimately 
the best guarantor of the integrity of the bond rating system’); Browne v Avvo (2007) 525 F Supp 2d 1249, 1252 (lawyer 
rating website); Castle Rock Remodeling v Bettter Business Bureau (2011) 354 SW 3d 234, 242-3 (rating of service 
providers by bureau on six-point scale). 
66  For the former: Lauer, above n 14, at 42 (defamation in general) and 68 (historic (though now discontinued) practice of 
communicating sensitive information verbally and in restrictive circumstances). For the latter: Seaton v TripAdvisor 
(2013) 728 F 3d 592; Clark v TripAdvisor [2014] CSIH 110; Burki v 70/30 Ltd [2018] EWHC 2151 (QB); the broader 
question of host liability for content posted by users (‘intermediary liability’) is also relevant here (and differs as between 
the general immunity in the US and the conditional exclusions more commonly found elsewhere, including the UK). 
67  Pasquale, above n 17, at 140; Joseph Turow, The Aisles Have Eyes: How Retailers Track Your Shopping, Strip your 
Privacy, and Define your Power (Yale University Press 2017) 262; Rule, above n 58, at 214 (noting the ‘genius of 
American liberalism…in mitigate[ing] the sting of the abuse and at the same time [consolidating] the position of the 
perpetrators’); Greta Krippner, ‘Democracy Of Credit: Ownership and the Politics of Credit Access in Late Twentieth-
Century’ (2017) 123 American Journal of Sociology 1; Fair Credit Reporting Act 1970, 15 USC §1681; Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act 1974, 15 USC §1691. For data protection in the EU see 4.3, below. 
68  http://www.trustbond.com; see Clancy Yeates, ‘How your social media account could help you get a loan’ Sydney 
Morning Herald (30 December 2017) https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/how-your-social-media-
account-could-help-you-get-a-loan-20171219-p4yxw0.html. 
69  http://www.lenddo.com; see discussion in Tianhui Tan and Tuan Phan, ‘Social Media-Driven Credit Scoring: the 
Predictive Value of Social Structures’ [2016] 37th International Conference on Information Systems 552 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2f1c/e382e2be6ff6c70e2a43e0197d89426992c9.pdf; Case Hynes, ‘How Social Media 
Could Help The Unbanked Land A Loan’ Forbes.com (25 April 2017) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chynes/2017/04/25/how-data-will-help-drive-universal-financial-access/. 
70  Catherine Cheney, ‘How Alternative Credit Scoring Is Transforming Lending In The Developing World’ Devex (8 
September 2016) https://www.devex.com/news/how-alternative-credit-scoring-is-transforming-lending-in-the-developing-
world-88487.  
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There has been a good deal of experimentation in the digital finance sector in terms of identifying 
creditworthiness, especially in conjunction with expansion into less developed economies.
71
 However, 
as with more conventional forms of credit scoring, the emphasis is often upon correlation rather than 
causation and can therefore introduce unintended discrimination such as regarding race.
72
 Observation 
of patent applications and corporate announcements discloses that service providers in the social 
media sector, such as Facebook, may be preparing for their own role in relation to future financial 
service products and the use of social media data in this context.
73
 
In her work on algorithms and decision-making, O’Neal distinguishes between the ‘relatively 
transparent’ and ‘regulated’ systems of credit scoring developed from the 1960s in the United States74 
and the ‘arbitrary, unaccountable, unregulated, and often unfair’ assessments made by lenders and 
others who use browsing data and other insights alongside more conventional scores in making 
decisions.
75
 On the other hand, Wei et al argue that using information from social media has the 
potential to ‘reduce lenders’ misgivings about engaging applicants with limited personal financial 
history’ and so improve, for some, access to finance.76 
Two further and related phenomena of interest in the present study can be observed within the world 
of online reputation: validation and aggregation. Validation is seen where third parties offer assistance 
or analysis of reputational information originally gathered for a single or more limited purpose. A 
leading player in this area, Traity (which was also a partner in the above-mentioned Trustbond scheme 
in Australia) explains its role as assisting users to ‘gather … reputation from different data sources so 
that [they] can control it, own it, and leverage [it]’.77 A related point may be the recent confirmation by 
Facebook that it maintains an internal system through which all users are rated for how ‘trustworthy’ 
they are,
78
 though its current function appears to be for Facebook’s own use in enforcing its own rules 
against its users. 
Aggregation is perhaps the most significant promised development, though again it can be seen as an 
obvious stage in the development of an information infrastructure, as occurred in relation to financial 
information in earlier decades. The exploration of the predictive value of credit scores (alone or in 
combination with consumer data) for non-credit questions, such as health, has also been noted,
79
 as has 
                                                     
71  Arjuna Costa, Anamitra Deb, and Michael Kubzansky, Big Data, Small Credit: the digital revolution and its impact on 
emerging market consumers (Omidyar Network, 2016) https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file_archive/ 
insights/Big%20Data,%20Small%20Credit%20Report%202015/BDSC_Digital%20Final_RV.pdf.  
72  Steve Lohr, ‘Creditworthy? Let’s Consider Capitalization’ New York Times (19 January 2015) A1; see further 4.3, below. 
73  Packin and Lev-Aretz, above n 44, at 344-5; as one analysis puts it, ‘Facebook could be the next FICO’ (referring to Fair 
Isaac & Co. scores used in the United States): Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution 
That Will Transform How We Live, Work and Think (John Murray 2013) 92; more sceptically, Ashesh Mukherjee, The 
Internet Trap: Five Costs of Living Online (University of Toronto Press 2018) 67 (‘imagine if Facebook were to combine 
their records with commercially available data from credit card companies, credit rating agencies, and census databases: 
they would have more information about us than our closest friends and family’). 
74  See above, n 13ff and accompanying text. 
75  Cathy O’Neal, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (Random 
House 2016) 142-145. 
76  Yanhao Wei, Pinar Yildirim, Christophe Van den Bulte, and Chrysanthos Dellarocas, ‘Credit Scoring with Social Network 
Data’ (2016) 35 Marketing Science 234, 249. 
77  http://www.traity.com; see Sundararajan, above n 42, at 98;  
78  Elizabeth Dwoskin, ‘Facebook is rating the trustworthiness of its users on a scale from zero to 1’ Washington Post (22 
August 2018). 
79  Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, above n 73, at 56-7. 
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the use of credit scores in dating services
80
 and in a wide range of other contexts, including ‘auto 
insurance assessments, cell phone contracts, residential rentals and even hiring decisions’.81 In an 
optimistic account of the potential for the sharing economy published in 2010, Botsman and Rogers 
purposed that there would soon be ‘some form of network that aggregates your reputation capital 
across multiple forms of collaborative consumption’.82 In the alternative, other projects have sought to 
provide cross-platform indications of influence; examples include Sociota (a paid service which seeks 
to measure ‘reach’ and ‘engagement’ of a presence on social media)83 and Klout (which attempted to 
measure ‘social media influence’ across multiple platforms, and closed in 2018).84  
Aggregated reputational information has the potential to address some of the known issues with the 
reliance of platforms upon their own reputation systems (such as disadvantaging new users without a 
reputational history on that platform
85) and facilitating ‘switching’ between services.86 Meanwhile, 
innovations in e-commerce and social media have included the use of social media logins for third 
party sites (which, subject to the appropriate terms and conditions and applicable laws, may provide 
direct access to further data or indirect access as a consequence of identification), the involvement of 
platforms in other fields (such as Snapchat’s interest in wearable technology and image recognition87) 
and the cross-referencing of merchant or ecommerce data with records obtained from data brokers 
(including those who have historically assigned credit scores).
88
 
2.5 Developing a conceptual framework 
The previous sections have shown that there is a considerable degree of diversity – but also some 
common themes – that are relevant for the understanding of rating systems. For the purposes of this 
paper (see Table 1), we identify six aspects where the degree to which the activity is regulated (or 
indeed directly managed by a public authority) can be identified (which we term the degree of 
interventionism). The first and most obvious question is whether the scheme itself is initiated and 
drafted by a private or public authority. Secondly, we ask whether the scheme has a single, specific 
aim, or a broader set of objectives across a number of functions or context. The third and fourth 
questions relate to the specific operation of the scheme: does it use multiple scores or a single score, 
and is a result indicative or definitive (e.g. a precise number)? Finally, we ask how transparent the 
scheme is, and the responsibility (private e.g. market forces or public e.g. through an oversight 
function) for monitoring it. 
                                                     
80  E.g. http://creditscoredating.com; see O’Neal, above n 75, at 321. 
81  Akos Rona-Tas, ‘The Off-Label Use of Consumer Credit Ratings’ (2017) 42 Historical Social Research 52, 53. 
82  Botsman and Rogers, above n 17, at 219. 
83  https://sociota.net. 
84  Adithya Rao, Nemanja Spasojevic, Zhisheng Li and Trevor D’Souza, ‘Klout Score: Measuring Influence Across Multiple 
Social Networks’ [2015] IEEE International Conference on Big Data 2282. 
85  On the need for a critical mass of active users, see Pierre Hausemer, ‘Exploratory study of consumer issues in online peer-
to-peer platform markets’ (2017), available at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45245, at 86-7. 
86  Vassilis Hatzopoulos, The Collaborative Economy and EU Law (Edward Elgar 2018) 197. 
87  See, e.g. Billy Gallagher, How To Turn Down A Billion Dollars: The Snapchat Story (St. Martin’s Press 2018) 230, 247-
251; Shannon Liao, ‘Snapchat is working on a feature that can find products you snap on Amazon’ The Verge (9 July 
2018) https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/9/17549372/snapchat-feature-find-amazon-products-google-lens; Arielle Pardes, 
‘Why Snap needs its spectacles’ Wired (May 2018) https://www.wired.com/story/why-snap-needs-its-spectacles/.  
88  Turow, above n 67, at 155-7. 
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Table 1: Degree of interventionism in rating systems 
 Low  Medium High 
1) Drafter Private Co-drafting State 
2) Aim Specific Socio-economic General 
3) Scoring Multiple Main and sub-indicators Single 
4) Application Flexible Comply or explain Uniform 
5) Algorithm Transparency Controlled transparency Protected 
6) Enforcement Market Stages of enforcement State 
Table 1 conceptualises how these six questions can be answered in a way that is ‘low’, ‘medium’ or 
‘high’ in terms of the interventionism of a rating system. For example, it can be seen that a system 
drafted by a private entity on a specific issue that is flexible in its application is at the lower end of 
interventionism, while a system drafted and enforced by a public authority, which aims to be 
comprehensive in its coverage, can be seen as highly interventionist. The table also indicates that 
intermediate models are possible, for example, as far as rating systems are co-drafted or applied with a 
‘comply or explain’ mechanism. It should be noted that some observations are tentative, in the absence 
of full disclosure by private parties as to how their systems operate
89
 – a point which we will return to 
below. 
Table 2 shows that this model can be further explained by applying it to a number of the schemes 
discussed above. For instance, sharing economy and other peer-to-peer platforms often use their own 
reputation system, with a specific aim of supporting transactions on that platform, and enforced by the 
market that the platform has instigated. Applying the system is relatively inflexible, though; as 
discussed above, an Uber driver’s entitlement to use the platform will be affected by her rating.  
 Table 2: Interventionism in selected rating systems 
 Credit ratings in 
many countries 
Point systems for 
traffic violations 
 UK research 
excellence 
framework 
Sharing economy 
platforms 
1) Drafter Low High High Low 
2) Aim Low/ 
Medium 
Low Low Low 
3) Scoring Medium Medium Medium Medium/ 
High 
4) Application Medium/ 
High 
High High High 
5) Algorithm Medium Low Medium Low/Medium 
6) Enforcement Low Medium Medium Low 
Overall, it can be seen that these rating systems combine different elements of low, medium and high 
interventionism. It is also noteworthy that none of these ratings have a high degree of interventionism 
in the fields ‘aim’ and ‘algorithm’: this is potentially different in the emerging Chinese system as it is 
                                                     
89  For example, while it can be assumed that a displayed rating is the mean of submitted scores (with or without explanatory 
comments or sub-scores), a service provider can choose to apply a weighting system which, for instance, controls for 
timeliness or the reliability of the person providing the rating: see further Lene Pettersen, ‘Rating Mechanisms Among 
Participants in Sharing Economy Platforms’ (2017) 22(12) First Monday http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v22i112.7908.  
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said to shift from ‘reputation society’ to the ‘reputation state’90 and thus to a more formalised model 
where reputation matters not only through societal forces (or as a self-contained aid to the use of a 
particular service) but as a tool of decision-making. Yet, the Chinese model also contains a number of 
nuances, to which we turn now. 
3. China: Social Credit System and reputation ratings 
3.1 Preliminary considerations 
The websites mentioned in the previous part are rarely used in China: Airbnb is available; yet, eBay 
and Uber have been unsuccessful in entering the Chinese market and many social media sites are 
blocked (e.g., Twitter and Facebook).
91
 Thus, Chinese citizens rely on the specific Chinese providers, 
which also implies that the Chinese government may in principle be able to get access to the 
corresponding user data. 
The previous part also discussed the use of financial credit rating systems in Europe and North 
America. The People’s Bank of China (i.e. the Chinese central bank) has established the Credit 
Reference Centre
92
 which provides both commercial and consumer credit reporting, based on credit 
information made available by banks and state institutions (e.g., regarding social welfare payments). 
The resulting reports are important for anyone who applies for a bank loan. Yet, these reports do not 
provide an actual rating of the creditworthiness of businesses and consumers, though this may change 
in the future due to the developments discussed in this part. 
The Chinese Social Credit System has received extensive coverage in the Western press, where it is 
often described as a big-data-driven comprehensive rating of all Chinese citizens.
93
 However, this is a 
misleading characterisation of the current situation. At present, three different models operate: China-
wide blacklists, compliance scores by pilot cities, and social credit scores by financial institutions. The 
main sections of this part will explain these forms of social control (3.2 to 3.4, below). Subsequently, 
this part will reflect on future developments and relate those to Western comments made about the 
Chinese model (3.5 and 3.6., below). 
3.2 The Social Credit System and the use of China-wide blacklists 
The introduction of the Social Credit System by the central government has a potentially far-reaching 
effect; yet, the China-wide measures that implement it are, so far, rather specific – namely, using 
blacklists – as this section explains. 
The Social Credit System aims to address not only the financial creditworthiness of individuals and 
companies but also their sincerity, honesty, and integrity.
94
 The initial discussions of the early 2000s 
                                                     
90  Xin Dai, ‘Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of China’ Working Paper (10 June 2018), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193577.  
91  Li Yuan, ‘A Generation Grows Up in China Without Google, Facebook Or Twitter’ New York Times (7 August 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/technology/china-generation-blocked-internet.html. Some other countries seem to 
follow, see  ‘Beijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Internet’ The Atlantic (18 June 2018) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/zte-huawei-china-trump-trade-cyber/563033/.  
92  See http://www.pbccrc.org.cn/crc/ (available in English) and https://ipcrs.pbccrc.org.cn with access to the information 
(available in Chinese only). 
93  See 3.6, below. 
94  See Rogier Creemers, ‘China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control’ Working Paper (9 May 2018), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175792, noting in footnote 13 that the Mandarin term for ‘credit’ (xinyong) 
cognates with terms for ‘sincerity, honesty, and integrity’; similar Dai, above note 90, at 16 (also on the use of the word 
‘social’). 
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put this in context of the objective to support the transition to a market economy after China’s 
accession to the WTO, for example, the need to combat commercial fraud and IP infringements.
95
 A 
2011 decision then also referred to ‘matters of social and political morality’ as points of concern.96 In 
2014 this was followed by the State Council’s ‘Notice concerning Issuance of the Planning Outline for 
the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)’,97 which forms the basis of the development 
of the Social Credit System today. This document mentions the aim to promote ‘integrity in 
government affairs’, ‘commercial sincerity’, ‘social integrity’ and ‘judicial public trust’ which shows 
that these measures are targeted at individuals (the focus of this paper), as well as companies, judicial 
organs, and other governmental authorities. It also explains that the ultimate goal is a uniform social 
credit system based on penalty and award mechanisms, presenting this idea in a general sense, with no 
references to quantitative measures and the collection of online data.
98
 
The specific penalty mechanisms that are already operational aim to enforce the blacklists of persons 
who have violated the law. They are implemented and enforced by different government authorities. 
The process started with a decision of the Supreme People’s Court on public blacklists of persons who 
defied legally binding judgments,
99
 but there are now also many further blacklists compiled by other 
authorities, for example, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism lists those who have violated transport 
rules, such as smoking or carrying prohibited items.
100
 Subsequently, a degree of centralisation has 
taken place. A central website makes the names of the blacklisted persons publicly available.
101
 There 
is also now a system in place that requires cooperation of authorities in their sanctions (the Joint 
Punishment System).
102
 This means that a violation of the law can lead to a variety of sanctions; it may 
start with a fine, but the perpetrator may subsequently be banned from flying or using high speed 
trains. It is also possible that these blacklists have implications on private-law relationships: while 
Chinese businesspersons may merely care about their own profits (and therefore be willing to do 
business with everyone), the recognition of blacklists by financial institutions can mean that 
blacklisted persons may not be able to use the funds on their current accounts in order to purchase a 
car or other luxury items.
103
 
Given the severe consequences of these blacklists, it is provided that individuals need to be notified in 
advance. There are also some internal review proceedings: for example, the State Administration of 
Taxation, which has its own system of blacklists, has a ‘credit repair mechanism’ that provides 
                                                     
95  See Martin Chorzempa, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks, ‘China’s Social Credit System: A Mark of Progress or a Threat to 
Privacy?’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 18-14 (June 2018), at 3; Creemers, above n 94, at 3. 
96  Central Committee. 18 October 2011 as translated at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2011/10/18/central-
committee-of-the-chinesecommunist-party-decision-concerning-deepening-cultural-structural-reform/.  
97  English translation available at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-
construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/. 
98  As also noted by Creemers, above n 94, at 13. 
99  Interpretation No. 17 [2013] of the Supreme People's Court, English translation available at 
www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=207020&EncodingName=gb2312. Search functions are available at 
http://zxgk.court.gov.cn/. 
100  See e.g. https://www.whatsonweibo.com/20-chinese-tourists-travel-blacklist/ and https://jingtravel.com/china-bans-169-
people-from-travel-with-new-blacklist/. 
101  See Credit China, www.creditchina.gov.cn/ and, for companies, the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity 
System, www.gsxt.gov.cn/. 
102  State Council Guiding Opinions concerning Establishing and Perfecting Incentives for Promise-keeping and Joint 
Punishment Systems for Trust-Breaking, and Accelerating the Construction of Social Sincerity, English translation 
available at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/05/30/state-council-guiding-opinions-concerning-
establishing-and-perfecting-incentives-for-promise-keeping-and-joint-punishment-systems-for-trust-breaking-and-
accelerating-the-construction-of-social-sincer/.  
103  For the latter point see 3.4, below. 
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correction of or relief from the blacklist under certain conditions.
104
 Moreover, in principle, there is 
also a right to appeal to court; yet, observers have been sceptical how far these legal safeguards are 
effective.
105
 
3.3 Pilot cities issuing compliance scores 
In addition to the China-wide implementation of the Social Credit System, the Chinese government 
authorised over forty pilot cities to experiment with forms of social credit and those experiments have 
also been underpinned by provincial and municipal legislation.
106
 The following will provide some 
representative examples. These local schemes also have to be seen in the wider context of the ways 
that Chinese regions and cities have developed elaborated tools of state surveillance and supervision. 
For example, in the provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet, there is said to be particularly extensive 
monitoring of internet use as well as elaborate registration and ID card requirements.
107
 More 
generally, CCTV cameras see widespread use in China, including forms of public shaming (e.g., 
publicly listing jaywalkers caught by facial recognition cameras in Shenzhen).
108
  
Two of the most extensive examples of regional pilots are from Suining in Jiangsu and Rongcheng in 
Shandong province. In both of these pilots, each citizen started with 1000 points. They could then lose 
points for a variety of infringements, such as traffic light violations, drunk driving, or having a child 
without the necessary administrative permission, but they could also re-gain points by ‘good’ actions, 
such as caring for elderly family members. The resulting points were then translated into a rating from 
A to D which could influence the individual in a positive or negative way in their dealing with the 
local government. For example, someone with a high rating would get preferential access to 
government subsidies, while someone with a low rating would be restricted in applications for 
housing, social welfare, business licenses, and public procurement.
109
  
Comparing these two pilots, the experience in Rongcheng is regarded as being more successful with 
the public than the one in Suining as the former relied more on positive effects of high ratings rather 
than negative ones for low ratings. This focus on incentives is also a feature of the Honest Shanghai 
scheme which only provides rewards for good ratings (i.e. no punishments for a poor one). Honest 
Shanghai is a voluntary smartphone app that asks users to enter their state ID number and then returns 
a rating as ‘very good’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This rating is apparently based on data the Shanghai 
government has collected about each citizen; details of the algorithm are however not transparent.
110
  
This use of incentives and algorithms can also be seen in the next category, namely the social credit 
scores developed by financial institutions. 
                                                     
104  See e.g. www.chinatax.gov.cn/eng/n2367751/c3633676/content.html  
105  Creemers, above n 94, at 19. For judicial review in China see also 4.3, below.  
106  For this legislation see also 4.3, below. 
107  See e.g. ‘Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China’s Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life’ Wall Street Journal (19 
December 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-
life-1513700355. 
108  See e.g. ‘Inside China’s surveillance state’ FT Magazine (20 July 2018); Creemers, above n 94, at 18 (for the jaywalking 
example). 
109  See e.g. ‘Life Inside China’s Social Credit Laboratory’ Foreign Policy (3 April 2018)  http://foreign-
policy.com/2018/04/03/life-inside-chinas-social-credit-laboratory/; Creemers, above n 94, at 10. 
110  See Mareike Ohlberg, Shazeda Ahmed, and Bertram Lang, ‘Central Planning, Local Experiments: The complex 
implementation of China’s Social Credit System’ Merics China Monitor (12 December 2017) at p 12. 
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3.4 Financial institutions providing social credit scores 
Financial institutions have also been allowed to create schemes implementing the Social Credit 
System. Many of these pilots consider a wide range of information, including social network data. 
Thus, it is justified here to talk about schemes measuring ‘social credit’ (and not simply questions of 
‘financial credit’). 
The most influential of these schemes has been Sesame Credit (also spelled Zhima Credit in English), 
developed by Alibaba’s subsidiary Ant Financial Group.111 It evaluates the creditworthiness of firms 
and individuals with a model of ‘smart business’ which captures information automatically and then 
evaluates it with algorithmic tools in real time.
112
 In detail, Sesame Credit scores each user on a scale 
of 350 to 950 points, based on five sets of information: (i) financial credit records, (ii) behavioural 
trends in commercial transactions, (iii) available assets and personal information, (iv) behaviour and 
preferences and (v) social relationships. As Sesame Credit is a smartphone app, linked to Alibaba’s 
mobile payment system Alipay, it is clear that it accesses the phones of its users for information 
gathering. Apart from that, it is not transparent which tools and algorithms are used. In particular, this 
applies to the broad categories (iv) and (v) where rumours are that factors are considered such as: 
excessively playing video games, cheating in online video games, and a frequent change of address 
(negative) and donations to charity, having friends with high Sesame Credit ratings, and polite 
behaviour on social media (positive).
113
  
The consequences of a high Sesame Credit rating are far-reaching. To start with, as this rating is 
provided by a financial institution, users with higher scores have better access to easy forms of credit. 
In addition, many other companies also consider the Sesame Credit rating through an agreement with 
Alibaba: for example, a high rating may mean that such users do not need to pay a deposit for renting 
a flat, a car or a bicycle,
114
 get faster check-in at hotels and airlines, and are displayed more 
prominently on dating websites (and users may also disclose a high score as a status symbol 
elsewhere, which apparently many do). The Chinese state is also not completely unconnected to the 
Sesame Credit rating and Alipay. On the one hand, for example, a high rating can make it easier to 
secure priority access in hospitals or a visa for overseas travel. On the other hand, Alibaba forwards 
non-compliance of payment obligations to the government, while also contributing to the 
implementation of China-wide blacklists through blocking certain transactions using Alipay.
115
  
In early 2018, however, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) decided to withhold a renewal of the 
licences for these private social credit scores. There is some speculation about the reasons for this 
decision, for example, that Alibaba and others may have got too powerful, that they have stated 
collecting too much personal and social information about their users, and that they may face conflicts 
of interest as they also benefit commercially from their customers.
116
 It also seems that the PBOC now 
                                                     
111  See https://www.xin.xin/ (in Chinese). 
112  Thus, this differs from conventional credit assessments, for details see Ming Zeng, Smart Business: What Alibaba’s 
Success Reveals About the Future of Strategy (Harvard Business Review Press, 2018). 
113  See e.g. Creemers, above n 94, at 22-23; Rachel Botsman, ‘Big data meets Big Brother as China moves to rate its citizens’ 
Wired (21 October 2017) http://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-government-social-credit-score-privacyinvasion; ‘The 
odd reality of life under China’s all-seeing credit score system’ Wired (5 June 2018), 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit. 
114  As also trialled in Australia; see 2.4, above. 
115  See 3.2, above. 
116  Dai, above n 90, at 17-8; Ohlberg et al., above n 110, at 12; ‘Here’s why China is concerned about Tencent and Alibaba’s 
credit scoring efforts’ Business Insider (6 February 2018)  http://uk.businessinsider.com/china-tencent-and-alibabas-new-
credit-scoring-solution-2018-2. But see also ‘Alibaba and Tencent have become China’s most formidable investors’ 
Economist (2 August 2018) https://www.economist.com/business/2018/08/02/alibaba-and-tencent-have-become-chinas-
most-formidable-investors (‘being able to manage a handful of established private players with long-standing links to the 
Communist Party, with their tentacles in many young firms, makes the whole tech industry easier to control’). 
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believes that it is a good time to design a new consolidated credit rating – called Baihang Credit score 
– to be developed by a public-private partnership between the PBOC and eight private financial 
institutions.
117
 
At present, it is not yet clear how this new system will operate. For example, it seems that the Sesame 
rating is to continue for non-credit purposes, such as the bike rentals, visa approvals and dating 
websites mentioned above. It is also too early to say whether the new Baihang Credit score will be 
more focussed on financial credit, as the PBOC’s involvement in the Credit Reference Centre118 may 
indicate, or whether it will incorporate the wide ‘social credit’ approach of Sesame Credit and other 
commercial ratings.  
3.5 Future perspectives and reception in China 
The previous sections have shown that it would be premature to talk about ‘the’ Social Credit System 
in China. Rather there are three different systems at the moment (with further sub-groupings possible) 
which follow somehow different logics. Table 3 maps those systems based on the distinction between 
high/medium/low ‘interventionist’ models, explained earlier in this paper.119 
Table 3: Degree of interventionism in the Social Credit System (so far) 
 China-wide blacklists 
(3.2 above) 
Pilot cities 
(3.3 above) 
Financial institutions 
(3.4 above) 
1) Drafter High High Low 
2) Aim Low Low High 
3) Scoring Low High High 
4) Application High Medium Medium 
5) Algorithm Low High High 
6) Enforcement High Medium Low 
 
It can be seen that all three existing systems have only some elements of a highly interventionist 
model: the China-wide blacklists due to the state influence in drafting and enforcement as well as their 
uniform application; the scores developed by pilot cities due to their belonging to the state, as well as 
single scoring mechanisms and protected algorithms; and the ratings by financial institutions due to 
their relatively general scope (going well beyond financial credit information) as well as their single 
scoring mechanisms and protected algorithms. 
This complex status quo raises the question whether the different elements will soon be consolidated 
into a ‘state-run meta social-credit system’?120 So, in the framework of the three models, will the 
future be a full interventionist system in all six categories?  
                                                     
117  See ‘Baihang and the Eight Personal Credit Programmes: A Credit Leap Forward’ What’s on Weibo (10 June 2018),  
https://www.whatsonweibo.com/baihang-and-the-eight-personal-credit-programmes-a-credit-leap-forward/. On the 
significance of public-private collaboration for the design of the Social Credit System more generally, see Fan Liang, 
Vishnupriya Das, Nadiya Kostyuk, and Muzammil M. Hussain, ‘Constructing a Data‐Driven Society: China’s Social 
Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure’ (forthcoming) Policy & Internet, DOI: 10.1002/poi3.183 17. 
118  See 3.1, above. 
119  See 2.5, above. 
120  Larry Catá Backer, ‘Measurement, Assessment and Reward: The Challenges of Building Institutionalized Social Credit 
and Rating Systems in China and in the West’, Proceedings of the Chinese Social Credit System, Shanghai Jaiotong 
University, 23 September 2017, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3040624, at p 7. 
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Such further evolution would assume that the current experience with the Social Credit System is a 
largely positive one. It may be argued that there is some evidence that this is indeed the case, although 
there are methodological and practical difficulties with exploring this in detail.
121
 The Chinese media 
mentions the way the Social Credit System can create a ‘culture of integrity’, solve economic 
problems and improve governance.
122
 More specifically, reports in Chinese newspapers most 
frequently emphasise its benefit for commerce and rural welfare. In particular, the argument is here 
that this system enables honest but poor persons (including small businesses) getting financial credit 
which otherwise would not be available.
123
 With respect to the Sesame Credit score, it is also said that 
it may give citizens more control over the impact of their actions than previously,
124
 and that the 
‘gamification’ of the Sesame Credit score as a reward system may be one of its practical 
advantages.
125
 And even the blacklisting system can be seen as beneficial for individuals as far as it 
induces their debtors (e.g., contractual counterparties) to comply with court judgments.
126
 
There has also been some public criticism of the emerging ratings in China – reflecting the well-
established interest in privacy (or the related concept of reputation) across societies,
127
 despite 
differences in legal and human rights protection. As regards the pilot cities, the Suining experiment 
was criticised by the official state media comparing it with the system of Good Citizen Cards used by 
the Japanese during the occupation of China during the Second World War.
128
 Similarly, an academic 
from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences argues that social credit should not cover any violation 
of moral behaviour, but that it needs to be defined in a narrow way as failure of compliance with legal 
and contractual obligations.
129
 There have also been discussions in Chinese media about problems of 
information security, data privacy and flaws in the technical design, in particular with respect to the 
ratings by financial institutions.
130
 Yet, of course, applying a comparative ‘Western’ perspective, the 
assessment may even be more critical, as will be seen in the next section.  
3.6 The Social Credit System and ‘Western values’ 
Most Western commentators resolutely reject the Chinese Social Credit System. The words frequently 
used are that it is a ‘tool for totalitarian surveillance’,131 an invention of ‘the digital totalitarian 
                                                     
121  See e.g. Martin Maurtvedt, The Chinese Social Credit System. Surveillance and Social Manipulation: A Solution to 
“Moral Decay”? (Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2017) http://hdl.handle.net/10852/60829 (interview subjects broadly 
in favour of the system, though with limited understanding of aspects thereof and the degree to which it has been 
criticised elsewhere).  
122  Ohlberg et al., above n 110, at 5-7. 
123  Saif Shahin and Pei Zheng, ‘Big Data and the Illusion of Choice: Comparing the Evolution of India’s Aadhaar and 
China’s Social Credit System as Technosocial Discourses’ (2018, forthcoming) Social Science Computer Review DOI: 
10.1177/0894439318789343 at pp 12-14. 
124  Botsman, above n 113, citing a blogger based in Shanghai. 
125  Zahy Ramadan, ‘The Gamification of Trust: The Case of China’s “Social Credit”’ (2018) 36 Marketing Intelligence & 
Planning 93. 
126  Cf. Creemers, above n 94, at 1 (Social Credit System as a substitute for weak law enforcement). 
127  See e.g. Joseph Cannataci, ‘Privacy, Technology Law and Religions across Cultures’ [2009] Journal of Information, Law, 
and Technology http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2009_1/cannataci. For China, see Maurtvedt, above n 121, at 40. 
128  Creemers, above n 94, at 10. 
129  Lin Yu, ‘Use Social Credit Cautiously and in Accordance with the Law’ Working Paper (2 October 2017), available at 
https://china-social-credit.com/changes-social-credit-19th-ccp-congress-1.  
130  ‘Sesame Credit apologizes for alleged Alipay privacy violation’ Global Times (1 April 2018) 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1083285.shtml; Ohlberg et al., above n 110, at 7; Maurtvedt, above n 121, at 36-7. See 
also 3.4 above (for the intervention of the PBOC). 
131  Ohlberg et al., above n 110, at 12. 
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state’,132 that it is ‘worse than an Orwellian nightmare’,133 a meeting of ‘big data’ with ‘Big 
Brother’,134 or indeed a meeting of Orwell’s 1984 with Pavlov’s dogs: ‘act like a good citizen, be 
rewarded and be made to think you're having fun’.135 However, understanding the Social Credit 
System as ‘merely’ a tool of state surveillance136 misunderstands the diversity of the current system, in 
terms of management but more importantly in terms of functions, as outlined in the previous sections. 
Still, as a more moderate form of criticism, we may also identify problems such as the confusion 
between conflicting objectives (and corresponding problems of construct validity), problems of data 
reliability (in particular as regards the measurement of soft factors) and the risks of a monopolist 
system lacking competition (with corresponding risks of corruption).
137
 
Another frequent reaction is that the Chinese Social Credit System is incompatible with Western 
political and cultural values. For example, it has been suggested that it may be suitable for an 
authoritarian political system, but not a liberal democracy: only the former system can be openly 
paternalistic, as inherent in the Social Credit System,
138
 and it may also be linked to other forms of 
control of personal behaviour used by the Chinese government, and associated with a Leninist idea of 
‘social management processes’, such as the records about the performance and attitudes of citizens 
(dang’an) and the household registration system (hukou).139 Another factor may be that there is 
widespread scepticism how far China has embraced the rule of law;
140
 thus, as far as this is doubted, it 
can be said that the Social Credit System would be problematic in the rule-of-law societies of the West 
as it lacks transparency, as it disrespects the divide between law and politics,
141
 and as it is not needed 
due to more effective law enforcement anyway.
142
  
Cultural differences may also be relevant. As some of the mechanism of the Social Credit System use 
forms of ‘shaming’, it may matter that in China shame is said to be an effective means of social 
control due to the desire to maintain harmony in relationships, as opposed to the rights focus of 
Western countries.
143
 As Western societies have lower thresholds as regards the feeling of 
                                                     
132  ‘China invents the digital totalitarian state’ The Economist (17 December 2016)  https://www.economist.com/news/ 
briefing/21711902-worrying-implications-its-social-creditproject-china-invents-digital-totalitarian. 
133  Dom Galeon, ‘China’s “Social Credit System” Will Rate How Valuable You Are as a Human’ Futurism (2 December 
2017) https://futurism.com/china-social-credit-system-rate-human-value. See also ‘Orwell’s Nightmare: China’s Social 
Credit System’ Asian Institute for Policy Studies (28 February 2017) http://en.asaninst.org/contents/orwells-nightmare-
chinas-social-credit-system/;  Jamie Horsley, ‘China’s Orwellian Social Credit Score Isn’t Real’ Foreign Policy (16 
November 2018) https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/16/chinas-orwellian-social-credit-score-isnt-real/. 
134  Botsman, above n 113.  
135  Ibid.  
136  Liang et al, above n 117. 
137  See e.g. Dermot Williamson, ‘China’s Online Consumerism: Managing Business, Moral Panic and Regulation’ Working 
Paper (29 July 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3181287, at pp 15-17. 
138  Creemers, above n 94, at 26 
139  Samantha Hoffman, ‘Managing the state: social credit, surveillance and the CCP’s plan for China’, China Brief, 
Jamestown Foundation, 17 August 2017, 17(11), 21; Botsman, above n 113. The latter also uses a point system, see Li 
Zhang, ‘Economic Migration and Urban Citizenship in China: The Role of Points Systems’ (2012) 38 Population and 
Development Review 503; for point-based systems of international migration see 2.3, above. 
140  Or how far China has its unique version: see e.g. John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett (eds), China’s Socialist Rule of 
Law Reforms Under Xi Jinping (London: Routledge 2016); Yuhua Wang, Tying the Autocrat’s Hands: The Rise of the 
Rule of Law in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
141  Creemers, above n 94, at 5. 
142  See also 3.1 and 3.5, above. 
143  Olwen Bedford and Kwang‐Kuo Hwang, ‘Guilt and Shame in Chinese Culture: A Cross‐cultural Framework from the 
Perspective of Morality and Identity’ (2003) 33 Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 127, 133. See also Sana 
Sheikh, ‘Cultural Variations in Shame’s Responses: A Dynamic Perspective’ (2014) 18 Personality and Social 
Psychology Review 384. 
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‘intrusion’,144 and as in China there is lower trust towards strangers (with corresponding higher trust in 
close networks of guanxi), a trust-building instrument such as the Social Credit System also seems to 
fit better with Chinese culture.
145
 This may also be seen in existing legal rules: the concern regarding 
data collection by states (or the use by states of data collected by others) highlighted in 20
th
 century 
abuses, has long informed the development of robust data protection legislation in the West, especially 
in the European Union,
146
 whereas data protection and privacy legislation in China is fragmentary at 
best.
147
  
However, this critical perspective should not be our final word on the comparative assessment of the 
Social Credit System. The following will therefore discuss how far, despite this criticism and despite 
these differences, something can be gained from comparing the model of Social Credit System with its 
Western counterparts.  
4. Comparison, evaluation and regulation 
4.1 Should we compare? 
Some argue that, for scholars from Western countries, Chinese law remains a ‘mystery’ that they 
cannot apprehend – and that any sense of understanding may be a mere illusion that tells us more 
about the Western legal culture than about the Chinese one.
148
 Thus, at least, authors from the West 
ought to be cautious in the way they can assess Chinese law. However, China has also transplanted a 
large number of legal concepts from Western countries in recent years.
149
 Thus, it can also be noted 
that contemporary Chinese law may, in many respects, not be fundamentally different from its 
Western counterpart, and that in both China and the West we have to understand how legal rules 
coevolve with political, social, economic and cultural factors in order to understand how ‘law 
works’.150 
For rating systems, a similar dialectic line of reasoning can be applied. On the one hand, as we have 
seen, the rating systems developed in the West have clear limits in their ‘interventionism’,151 while it is 
possible that in China a fully ‘interventionist’ system will be implemented in the near future:152 thus, it 
seems that, in comparison, this ‘unification of the various elements, and their seamless operation 
would be a great innovation’,153 or in any case ‘unique’ as compared to anything that is happening in 
the West.
154
  
                                                     
144  Backer, above n 120, at 14. 
145  See generally Williamson, above n 137. 
146  E.g. David Cole and Federico Fabbrini, ‘Bridging the Transatlantic Divide? The United States, the European Union, and 
the Protection of Privacy Across Borders’ (2016) 14 International Journal of Constitutional Law 220, 225-6; Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier, above n 73, ch 8. 
147  See Yongxi Chen and Anne SY Cheung, ‘The Transparent Self under Big Data Profiling: Privacy and Chinese Legislation 
on the Social Credit System’ (2018) 12 Journal of Comparative Law 356, and for the local legislation also Dai, above n 
90, at 23.  
148  See the discussion in Tianshu Zhou and Mathias Siems, ‘Contentious Modes of Understanding Chinese Commercial Law’ 
(2015) 6 George Mason Journal of International Commercial Law 177. 
149  Ibid. (with examples from contract law and company law). 
150  Ding Chen, Simon Deakin, Mathias Siems and Boya Wang, ‘Law, Trust and Institutional Change in China: Evidence 
from Qualitative Fieldwork’ (2017) 17 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 257. 
151  See 2.5, above. 
152  See 3.5, above. 
153  Backer, above n 120, at 15. 
154  Dai, above n 90, at 1. 
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On the other hand, this should not lead to the conclusion that the Social Credit System and its Western 
counterparts are incommensurable. Some of the aspects of the Chinese system are not part of the 
Western rating systems; yet, they are not completely alien to the West. For example, it was explained 
that, as part of the Social Credit System, China uses blacklists of persons who have violated the law in 
order to exclude them with the help of data sharing from many aspects of social life.
155
 Chorzempa et 
al relate this to the use of background checks and ‘no-fly lists’ in the US;156 other instances include the 
system of control of football spectators in the UK (‘football banning orders’), which includes the 
temporary holding of passports during relevant periods (international fixtures) to prevent travel.
157
 It 
can also be noted that criminal records and details of insolvent debtors are collected and may be 
shared more or less widely in a number of European states.
158
 The imposition of a criminal sentence 
can also incorporate a variety of sanctions in some Western countries: for example, temporary driving 
bans may be an ancillary penalty for criminal convictions (even they do not relate to traffic 
offences)
159
 and disenfranchisement may follow automatically from imprisonment.
160
  
It can also be seen that the design and regulation of today’s rating systems are already clear examples 
of policy diffusion.
161
 The Chinese system partly derives from its Western counterparts: the financial 
credit scoring systems of Western countries have been an initial source of influence, and more recent 
tools such as the Sesame Credit scores may be seen as an example of the ‘gamification’ of rating 
systems in recent time.
162
 In return, the growing global influence of China
163
 can mean that the Social 
Credit System may well be a regulatory tool which could inspire the West: the Social Credit System 
may show that China now ‘appears to have ascended to the position of principal global driving force 
in political theory and action’,164 with ‘the potential to change law and government as we know them 
in China and beyond’.165 And while Pasquale highlights the shift towards a ‘scored society’ beyond the 
narrower functions of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century, recent developments in China suggest, as noted above, 
a shift from ‘reputation society’ to ‘reputation state’.166 
Thus, the question arises how such a future development should be assessed: in other words, if 
reputation and rating systems consolidate in Western markets in a similar fashion, what opportunities 
and controversies will arise – and how should law makers intervene? How is, to take Rule’s 
conclusion from his 1973 analysis of the emerging challenge of privacy and technology, the ‘seductive 
appeal of mass surveillance’ (including convenience or quality of life) to be addressed alongside a 
                                                     
155  See 3.2, above. 
156  Chorzempa et al., above n 95, at 4 and 7. 
157  Football Spectators Act 1989; see further https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/football-related-offences-and-football-
banning-orders.  
158  For criminal records see e.g. for the UK: Police Act 1997, part 5; for Germany: Bundeszentralregistergesetz 1971 (as 
amended). For debtors see e.g. for the UK: https://www.gov.uk/search-bankruptcy-insolvency-register; for Ireland: 
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Colin Murray, ‘A Perfect Storm: Parliament and Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 511. 
161  For the general literature on this topic see e.g. Erin R. Graham, Charles R. Shipan and Craig Volden, ‘Review Article: The 
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162  See 3.1, 3.5 as well as 2.4, above. 
163  See 1, above. 
164  Backer, above n 120, at 2. 
165  Dai, above n 90, at 1. 
166  See 2.5, above. 
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greater understanding of dangers?
167
 Will rating systems have different impacts on different groups of 
people, especially if there is a shift away from opt-in systems (where there may be incentives for 
participation) to systems that are (perhaps de facto if not yet de jure) universal? 
4.2 A simplified normative framework 
Evaluating rating systems is complex as much will depend on their precise substance and context. 
Thus, it could be suggested that mutual learning between such systems is likely to work best if they 
are based on a broadly similar design. Similarly, it will be helpful to move away from generalised 
criticisms or concerns towards a more precise identification of shortcomings of particular 
implementations. Indeed, it is also worth considering how far the reasons for and against systems with 
very different designs may stimulate mutual learning. Here, at the level of some generality, it is 
possible to identify possible shortcomings of systems that are either based on a low or a high level of 
intervention (or to put it in another way, the advantages of either of those systems), following the 
categories developed earlier in this paper.
168
 
Table 4: Typical shortcomings of low and high interventionist rating systems 
 Low  High 
1) Drafter Private drafters may disregard 
public interest, with limited 
opportunities for oversight 
State’s monopoly may be abused, with 
limited checks and balances including 
through competition 
2) Aim Specific systems may be biased 
towards narrow interests 
General systems may lead to 
disproportionate control of behaviour 
3) Scoring Multiple scores may lead to 
conflicting incentives 
Single score may disregard complexities 
of social reality 
4) Application Flexible use may open door to 
corruption and biases  
Uniform application may neglect fairness 
of individual case 
5) Algorithm Transparency may harm operation 
through game-playing 
Protected algorithm may disregard need 
for accountability  
6) Enforcement Markets may lack effective means 
of enforcement 
State may respond with overly harsh and 
rigid sanctions  
 
As the overview in Table 4 illustrates, a priori, it does not seem justified to regard either a low or a 
high interventionist system as superior. Indeed, it can be seen that in many circumstances the 
advantages of one of the systems are the disadvantages of the other one, and vice versa. For example, 
when a high interventionist system is inflexible, it may also be said that it is effective; and when a low 
interventionist system is biased towards narrow interests, a high interventionist system may be overly 
diffuse.  
Thus, a possible response could be that a medium level of interventionism (as included in Tables 1 to 
3, above) may be a good compromise. Notably, it may follow that a ‘softening’ of the highly 
interventionist approach of the Chinese Social Credit System with tools developed elsewhere may 
achieve the ‘best of both worlds’. It is therefore worth examining how far legal and regulatory tools 
from the West (but possible also elsewhere) can address some of the shortfalls of rating systems but 
also retain their benefits. In the next sections, we therefore review some of the current debates 
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regarding regulation (4.3 below), before returning to the Chinese system, now considered as a part of 
global trends (4.4 below). 
4.3 The complexities of regulating ratings 
The Chinese Social Credit System has been accompanied by a large volume of legislation and other 
policy documents: for example, a recent article lists 15-pages of documents produced by the central 
government and other public authorities,
169
 and there are also many provincial and municipal pieces of 
legislation, discussed later in this section. The majority of those rules are about the technical operation 
of the Social Credit System, which is not the main focus of this paper. Thus, before returning to 
aspects of the current Chinese law at the end of this section, we start with the way some of the more 
general policy considerations have been addressed in Europe and elsewhere in the West.   We identify 
here the benefits of data (for consumer protection and law enforcement), some concerns regarding 
competition, the possibility of discrimination, and the protection of privacy. 
The European Commission deems ‘online rating and review systems’ as an important safeguard for 
sharing or collaborative economy platforms, especially in the absence of the relevant information or, 
in some circumstances, the inapplicability of consumer protection rules.
170
 Law enforcement 
authorities have long recognised the valuable role played by records gathered in the private sector: 
consumer credit agencies in the US often provided co-operation,
171
 and present day intelligence and 
policing functions make use of data collected for private sector Internet purposes (whether for an 
Internet connection or an online service)
172
 or obtain it through interception,
173
 all of which typically 
goes beyond what a state can gather through its own resources.
174
  
An extensive review carried out in anticipation of a 2016 OECD summit identified the effort it takes 
for users (providers and customers) of sharing economy and similar services to ‘build reputation’ 
through, for instance, positive ratings, or to understand how reputation is handled within a service.
175
 
This can be a disincentive to ‘switching’ between services, owing to the need to rebuild reputation or 
one’s understanding of trust and risk after a switch.176  
Others highlight, within a service, the extent to which the reliance upon rating and reputation may 
have a disparate impact on some groups and constitute a form of (albeit possibly unintended) 
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discrimination,
177
 and how ‘neutral’ systems, even where there is no evidence of consumer 
discrimination, can still produce unequal outcomes on vectors such as gender pay.
178
 Although the 
specific area of credit benefits from explicit prohibitions on the use of certain data, even this area sees 
the use of alternative data sources that may aid in discrimination in practice.
179
 Some argue, however, 
that reputation-led approaches could still displace existing discrimination,
180
 or flag an open question 
as to whether algorithmic approaches could make hidden discrimination visible and create further 
problems of discrimination anew.
181
 A recent decision of an equality tribunal in Finland highlighted 
how automated decisions made by credit entities through statistical profiling can violate anti-
discrimination provisions of national law.
182
 Both data collected from users (possibly including 
browsing history)
183
 and credit records
184
 can be used as an aid to price differentiation, which is also 
controversial (and has the potential for disparate impact). 
It is clear from case law on privacy as a human right that the most extreme forms, such as the 
compiling and use of a ‘blacklist’ of workers on the grounds of their trade union activity, is suspect.185 
The parallel growth in significance of data protection law, first in individual states and then through a 
Council of Europe convention
186
 and EU Directive,
187
 and most recently the coming into force of an 
extensive General Data Protection Regulation in the European Union (GDPR),
188
 provides a partial 
framework for the regulation of rating and reputational data. Data protection laws provide further 
detail on the conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful. One example is whether 
there is a way that data can be updated and challenged. Automatic deletion of negative information 
after a set period has been a feature of some credit recording systems,
189
 and the famed challenge to 
Google’s indexing of an old news report on the forced sale of property on foot of an unpaid debt 
succeeded on the basis of data protection law
190
 even before it was strengthened in the GDPR. With 
the GDPR now in force, further attention is likely to be paid to the right, in some circumstances, not to 
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be subject to a decision with legal or similar effects based solely on automated processing,
191
 and the 
possibility, in other circumstances where automated decision-making is lawful, to receive an 
explanation and an opportunity to challenge.
192
 Nonetheless, there will continue to be situations 
(expressly provided for in GDPR) where consent is not required (as other legal bases are available), 
which supports the development of powerful, potentially universal systems. 
Provisions of this type may begin to provide a framework where problems of validity and reliability, 
which have been the subject of warnings both in the West and in China,
193
 can be addressed. However, 
although influenced by earlier Western laws,
194
 Chinese law on privacy and data protection remains 
fragmented and drafted in reaction to specific problems rather than as an overarching framework,
195
 
while such fragmentation is also a feature of US law (though credit records are, as discussed above, 
one of the areas subject to specific regulation), but less of a problem in the European Union. Similarly, 
privacy and data protection concerns are at the core of the criticism of services like Peeple, a proposed 
service that would have allowed individuals to ‘rate’ others whether they used the service or not. Thus, 
it was subsequently launched as a more limited service in light of such concerns,
196
 though somewhat 
similar projects are also being developed by others, especially regarding online dating.
197
 
Specifically concerning the Chinese situation, the relevance of access and correction rights under 
privacy and data protection law are said to be affected by the limitations on actions against public 
authorities in Chinese law.
198
 Even as far as judicial review of public authorities is feasible, the issue 
remains how far Chinese courts can said to be independent enough in deciding cases that involve the 
state on the one side and private parties on the other.
199
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
this general issue about courts in China in detail – and, to the best of our knowledge, there have not yet 
been any judicial challenges in matters concerning the Social Credit System in China. From a policy 
perspective, however, we suggest that judicial review should be provided as a way of protecting 
individual rights but also as a means of checks and balances of the design and operation of the Social 
Credit System. 
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Considering further details of Chinese law, the provincial and municipal pieces of legislation are the 
ones that address issues of the Social Credit System in the most coherent and concise fashion.
200
 For 
example, the 56 articles of the Shanghai Social Credit Regulations 2017 are structured according to the 
headings (i) General provisions, (ii) Social credit information, (iii) Credit incentives and restrictions, 
(iv) Protection of information subjects’ rights and interests, (v) Regulating and advancing the 
development of the credit services industry, (vi) The establishment of a social credit environment, (vii) 
Legal responsibility, and (viii) Supplemental provisions, with a noticeable desire to provide legal 
certainty to anyone affected by the Social Credit System. However, this is apparently also done in a 
way that does not limit the possible actions of the state authorities, as wide general sanctions such as 
‘restrict entry into relevant markets and industries’ and ‘restrict enjoyment of relevant public policies’ 
show.
201
  
4.4 The Social Credit System in a global context  
Key to understanding the history of rating in the West and the controversy over the Social Credit 
System in China is the recognition that all systems are based on a certain combination of inputs and 
outputs, which may have strong normative or behavioural dimensions. As argued in an early account 
of the developing Social Credit System, drawing explicit links between developments in the West and 
in China, ‘in both Silicon Valley and in Beijing, there is this notion that we can use technology to 
shape and reshape incentives in such a way that people will behave better’.202 In this section, therefore, 
we situate the Social Credit System in a broader context, first identifying character, information 
systems, and participation as core concerns, before turning to explore the degree to which reputation-
based systems can be regulated. In so exploring the prospects for regulation, we draw again upon 
historical antecedents and developments in cognate areas (e.g. the power of online ‘platforms’ more 
generally), highlighting the implications of the complexity discussed in 4.3, above. 
The history of credit registries and scores identifies a long-running ‘character’ dimension, including 
the desired impact upon consumer behaviour, the framing of a good credit score as a moral virtue, the 
use of data (via informants or otherwise) on personal character, and attempts to incorporate factors 
such as ‘honesty’ and ‘clean living’ into scoring.203 Sesame Credit may be novel if it makes use of 
video game playing as a signal,
204
 though American credit rating pioneers were well ahead of Alibaba 
in making careful note of alcohol consumption and gambling habits.
205
 The ways in which systems in 
China – or indeed experiments like Lenddo, using carefully chosen proxies206 – address these issues is 
therefore not a difficult leap from this American history of scoring. Moreover, the linguistic 
similarities of the Mandarin terms discussed above (e.g. sincerity, honesty)
207
 emphasise a point also 
understood in the West (where credit – and indeed credibility – derive from the Latin ‘credere’, for 
trust or belief, with the Christian ‘Creed’ taking its English name from its Latin opening words, ‘credo 
in unum Deum’ (I believe in one God). 
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Furthermore , both the relatively uniform approach being worked up in China and the less obviously 
interconnected developments in the West can be understood as part of the continuing reverberations of 
how information systems now operate – that is, the mainstreaming of digital technologies and the vast 
amounts of data that are created (not just by institutions but by individuals). Such data can come 
through deliberate disclosure (e.g. on social media or by agreeing to take part in a loyalty scheme), but 
also through their data trails (e.g. browsing history, location data collected by an app) and through the 
actions of other individuals. The initiatives in China are influenced by a systems theory approach to 
information, paying special attention to flows and loops as an emerging modality of governance.
208
 
Unsurprisingly, some analysts of the Social Credit System ask questions about how the availability 
and reuse of reputational data, especially at the level of big data, affects the regulatory state itself
209
 – 
just as developments in information processing and management, and theoretical consideration of 
systems theory approaches, informed Western approaches to governance during the post-1945 
period
210
 and are at the heart of debate on the degree to which the Internet itself can be governed.
211
 
The arguments that performance management schemes have become normalised and so now require 
the analysis of mission, commensuration, and vision,
212
 and that classifications embedded in 
information infrastructures require political and ethical study,
213
 are surely capable of application to 
the various systems we discuss here, including those still in development.  
Finally, it can be noted that the centrality of ratings and reputation poses questions about the 
relationship between technology and representative democracy, In Europe and North America, one 
iteration of such is speculation regarding whether new deployments of information technologies could 
support new or revitalised forms of public participation.
214
 As explained in the discussion of novel 
forms of credit scoring,
215
 the hypothesis that better use of a broader range of data democratises access 
to resources and markets is clearly present in the arguments of developers. In the case of China, 
although there is speculation whether China will democratise,
216
 this seems rather unlikely in the near 
future. So, while the Social Credit System may give Chinese citizens more control over the impact of 
their actions than previously,
217
 in China technology may rather be seen as an alternative to 
representative democracy. In other words, it is suggested that the Social Credit System can be one of 
the means used by ‘the center of figuring out what’s going on at lower levels and across society’ 
instead of relying on electoral feedback and related forms of civil activism.
218
 
With these points in mind, we now turn to broader questions of how the technologies in use might be 
the subject of regulation. The innovation associated with recent developments in China provides a 
useful set of sub-questions that will inform the debate on how reputation-based systems ought to be 
regulated in the West, and indeed. With key differences between conventional Western credit scoring 
and the Social Credit System including the use of a broader set of data, the enforcement of outcomes, 
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and the use of devices and sensors to add real-time data,
219
 and the clear echoes of each of these points 
in the historical evolution of credit and reputation schemes in the West (e.g. the impact of 
computerisation, or the link between reputation and continued use of a platform), these go beyond 
theoretical questions. Indeed, critiques of innovation both in the established credit sector and in social 
media
220
 demonstrate the types of concerns that will inform debate on the regulatory approach to 
reputation in the very near future. If these systems ‘spread’ to other spheres of interaction and 
governance, lessons learned from earlier implementations of reputation-led approaches will form an 
important part of the design process. 
A tension between centralised and distributed or fragmented reputation and rating systems is evident 
both in China and in the West. An overt form of centralisation appears more likely in the former 
(where private systems may be permitted limited autonomy within the context of an overarching 
system) than in the latter (where single systems of data are the subject of particular criticism, even 
where the same effect is achieved by less direct means).
221
 On the other hand, both the approach to 
development in China (which allows for municipal variation)
222
 and the fashion for city- or sub-city 
based experimentation with data collection and analysis in Western ‘smart city’ initiatives223 pose 
more difficult questions. Should the spread of reputation-based systems be seen as a type of policy 
diffusion?
224
 If so, could spatially limited initiatives avoid the worst effects of mass surveillance and 
allow for the impact of variations in design and implementation to be tested? Or are Western cities, as 
Greenfield argues, setting out the ‘material conditions … for Chinese-style social credit to spread’?225 
Although we have sought to explain the impact of intervention across a number of sub-categories, it 
may be the case that a recommendation independent of context is not possible. Instead, the degree of 
intervention may be determined in light of overriding questions. What are the means by which 
accountability can be best secured? Is competition (and the pressure that it might create towards 
accuracy and relevance) appropriate? How can a system remain responsive (for instance, adaptable 
and flexible in light of technological developments or attempts to exploit a system inappropriately)?  
Moreover, the primary locus of intervention is likely to be the provider of the rating system. In some 
cases, this will be a service provider or the administrator of a platform through which others provide 
services; in other cases, the platform may manage a rating system but not be involved in the delivery 
of a specific service – also noting that much of the legal complexity of the developing system in China 
is found in the interaction between different emanations of the state and between state and non-state 
entities.
226
 In the specific area of reputation systems, it has been recognised that the initial position that 
the ‘abundant information’ available makes intervention unnecessary has come under challenge, 
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especially on the grounds of transparency and accountability.
227
 The continuing evolution of data-
driven approaches to reputation also requires further study of the impact of measurement upon 
behaviour, including the creation of perverse incentives and non-productive attempts to ‘game’ 
systems.
228
 
We have already seen a refocusing of regulatory efforts in the European Union towards platforms of 
various sorts, which provides some guidance on possible approaches for rating systems. A good 
example is online dispute resolution, where a Regulation and Directive of 2013 sets standards for 
approved dispute resolution providers (i.e. expertise, independence and impartiality; transparency; 
effectiveness; fairness; legality; liberty) and requires others to link to or cooperate with approved 
providers.
229
 More recent scoping work by the European Commission identifies a broad category of 
‘platforms’ which have increasing significance and influence, for which existing legal tools in fields 
such as competition and liability may alone be suboptimal.
230
 Similarly, there is a lively debate on the 
regulation of emerging applications of artificial intelligence,
231
 going beyond the specific issues of 
automation dealt with (to some extent) by existing law and overlapping with calls for accountability 
and transparency regarding the use of algorithms,
232
 which without attention may make ‘decisions … 
inscrutable and thereby incontestable’.233 
In concluding this contextual analysis of reputation systems, it is helpful to recall a recent debate in the 
field of law and development  the rapid economic development of China and the possible role of 
Western-style law in promoting it.
234
 Here then the Social Credit System may indicate a paradigm shift 
in both aspects of this causal relationship: it challenges us to move beyond Western-style law and it 
poses the question how a system that also promotes social development can be designed. Shaming, to 
give one example, is a powerful feature of Internet communications, whether in a formal sense as 
under development in China
235
 or for all users, especially of social media.
236
 The presentation of the 
Social Credit System as farfetched or as an exemplar of State control of information is not just 
complacent; it ignores the longer history of reputational information in various Western contexts, and 
the degree to which similar phenomena have taken on significance, albeit with different levels of 
intervention, in transnational e-commerce and sharing platforms (and in the most recent attempts to 
reuse or merge data). For example, the unfinished business of whether new approaches to reputation 
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promote access to finance for the 21
st
 century ‘honest but poor’ of China or the 19th century 
hardworking immigrant to the United States, or constitute a new threat of further discrimination – or 
both – requires a less complacent approach. Consideration of what is underway in China can therefore, 
for instance, prompt productive discussion of the adequacy and focus of existing regulatory 
mechanisms in the West – especially at a time of unprecedented scrutiny of the ethics of Silicon 
Valley and the implications of the digital revolution. 
5. Conclusion 
In English-language newspapers a common frame of discussing the Chinese Social Credit System is 
an episode of the science fiction series ‘Black Mirror’.237 This episode, Nosedive, imagines a future 
society in which every citizen has a rating from ‘0’ to ‘5’ which derives from the subjective 
assessments made by everyone else using a mobile phone app. This rating then has a social function 
(in the episode: who gets invited to a wedding party), but it also determines commercial decisions (in 
the episode, for example, the type of car you can hire or neighbourhood in which you can live) and 
access to public services (in the episode: in prioritising medical treatment). At its extreme, the rights of 
the individual are at stake; the episode closes with the main character’s score dropping to zero, and so 
removed from the ‘platform’ – through the removal of the lenses that provide, in the style of 
augmented reality, real-time access to data – and, apparently, imprisoned. 
The intuitive parallel to the Chinese system is that, here too, individuals are rated with a single score 
and that this score can have for a variety of consequences. However, there are some profound 
differences. The most obvious one is that the Social Credit System is not based on the subjective 
ratings by other citizens. Indeed, it may be said that this subjectivity is closer to the contemporary 
Western ratings such as Uber and Airbnb than the more objective (and more algorithmic) emerging 
Chinese one. Moreover, from a normative perspective, a recent newspaper article notes: ‘No, China 
isn’t Black Mirror – social credit scores are more complex and sinister than that’ given that in ‘China 
and elsewhere, the implied threat isn’t the tyranny of the crowd, but state and corporate power’.238 In 
support of this mere acceptance of contemporary Western ratings, it could also be said that it is just a 
normal feature of human societies that we depend on the subjective judgments of others, regardless 
whether this is quantified or not.  
Yet, this negative comparative assessment of the Social Credit System may not be a matter of course. 
Ratings initiated by the state or companies may be designed in a way that they provide targeted 
incentives (not simply ‘being nice’ as in the Black Mirror episode – which is silent on how the system 
came about or who controls it). It may also be an advantage that ‘interventionist’ or centrally planned 
rating systems can more easily be shaped and controlled by law and regulation. This is relevant for the 
Chinese context as the Social Credit System is in a transitional stage with its current mix of China-
wide blacklists and ratings by pilot cities and financial institutions. It is also relevant for Western 
countries where, at present, public authorities are more likely to engage with rating and reputation 
systems through acquiescence or encouragement, and only sometimes through regulation, which may 
be indirect.  
Thus, in this paper, we argue that the Chinese models (not model) of new approaches to credit should 
be studied in the West, not as a template or even a counter-model, but as illustrations of the 
implications of today’s emphasis upon quantification and reputation across a range of domains, 
                                                     
237  A combined Google News search for ‘social credit system’ and ‘black mirror’ leads to 1,390 hits as of 30 November 
2018. 
238  ‘No, China isn’t Black Mirror – social credit scores are more complex and sinister than that’ New Statesman (27 April 
2018), https://www.newstatesman.com/world/asia/2018/04/no-china-isn-t-black-mirror-social-credit-scores-are-more-
complex-and-sinister. On how the SCS ought to prompt a wider reassessment of surveillance and power, see e.g. Katika 
Kühnreich, ‘Soziale Kontrolle 4.0? Chinas Social Credit Systems’ [2018] 7 Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 
63 https://www.blaetter.de/archiv/jahrgaenge/2018/juli/soziale-kontrolle-4.0-chinas-social-credit-systems. 
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personal and official. Such illustrations can also inform law-making efforts in the West. Specifically, 
this paper addressed some of the core general issues that law makers should consider. We discussed 
six aspects where the degree to which the activity is regulated (or indeed directly managed by a public 
authority) can be identified: drafters, aims, scoring systems, application, use of algorithms, and 
enforcement. We also indicated that law making in this field can be either through the introduction of 
a new regulatory regime or the application of general requirements to a particular context. It may also 
be unlikely that there will be a single ‘law on ratings’ given the relevance of many overlapping policy 
considerations and corresponding fields of law, such as e-commerce law, privacy and data protection 
law, anti-discrimination law, tort law, competition law, sector specific regulation on financial services, 
and so forth.  
Finally, we suggest that where there is a need for regulation, the first focus should be on the provider 
of the rating system. This should also incorporate means by which accountability can be best secured, 
such as forms of online dispute resolution but also the availability of conventional judicial scrutiny. 
Importantly, any law making in this field also needs to be done with full understanding of the 
technological and behavioural aspects of the rating systems under consideration: for example, we have 
noted problems of validity, reliability and responsiveness, including attempts to ‘game’ systems. Thus, 
this calls for not only a comparative but also an interdisciplinary perspective, as we also aspired to in 
this paper. Rating systems have been commercially and socially important in different ways in China 
and elsewhere, and so questions of regulation require not just attention to the systems currently used in 
one context (or on an apparently voluntary basis), but to the ways in which they are likely to develop, 
through taking on additional functions or more ambitious types of aggregation. 
  
 
 
  
 
